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Abstract
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol that finds a number of
applications, in particular, as an essential building block for two-party and multi-party com-
putation. We construct a round-optimal (2 rounds) universally composable (UC) protocol
for oblivious transfer secure against active adaptive adversaries from any OW-CPA secure
public-key encryption scheme with certain properties in the random oracle model (ROM). In
terms of computation, our protocol only requires the generation of a public/secret-key pair,
two encryption operations and one decryption operation, apart from a few calls to the random
oracle. In terms of communication, our protocol only requires the transfer of one public-key,
two ciphertexts, and three binary strings of roughly the same size as the message. Next, we
show how to instantiate our construction under the low noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC,
LWE, and CDH assumptions. Our instantiations based on the low noise LPN, McEliece, and
QC-MDPC assumptions are the first UC-secure OT protocols based on coding assumptions
to achieve: 1) adaptive security, 2) optimal round complexity, 3) low communication and
computational complexities. Previous results in this setting only achieved static security and
used costly cut-and-choose techniques. Our instantiation based on CDH achieves adaptive
security at the small cost of communicating only two more group elements as compared to
the gap-DH based Simplest OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi (Latincrypt 15), which only
achieves static security in the ROM.
1 Introduction
Oblivious transfer (OT) [90, 53] is one of the major protocols within the realm of modern cryp-
tography. It is a fundamental building block for secure two-party and multi-party computation.
In this work, we will mainly focus on 1-out-of-2 string oblivious transfer, which is a two-party
protocol. Here, the sender (called Alice) inputs two strings m0 and m1, and the receiver (called
Bob) inputs a choice bit c, and obtains mc as the output. Bob must not be able to learn m1−c,
while Alice must not learn c. Since oblivious transfer is normally used within other protocols as
a primitive, it is desirable to ensure that its security is guaranteed even under concurrent compo-
sition, using the universal composability (UC) framework [17]. Given the possible development
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of full-scale quantum computers, it is natural to look for protocols that implement oblivious
transfer based on assumptions that are not known to be broken by quantum adversaries.
1.1 Our contributions
We propose a framework for obtaining oblivious transfer, which is UC-secure against active
adaptive adversaries in the random oracle model. At the high level, our construction works as
follows. We use a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme satisfying the following two properties:
• Property 1 (informal): Let the public-key space PK form a group with operation denoted
by “⋆”. Then, for the public keys (pk0, pk1), such that pk0 ⋆ pk1 = q, where q is chosen
uniformly at random from PK, one cannot decrypt both ciphertexts encrypted using pk0
and pk1, respectively. In particular, when the public/secret-key pair (pkc, skc), c ∈ {0, 1},
is generated, the above relationship guarantees that pk1−c that is chosen to satisfy the
constraint pk0⋆pk1 = q is “substantially random”, so that learning the messages encrypted
with pk1−c is hard.
• Property 2 (informal): pk obtained using the key generation algorithm is indistinguishable
from a random element of PK. Note that we assume in this work that, in general, not all
the elements of PK may represent valid public-keys.
Now, in our construction, the receiver generates a key pair (pkc, skc), queries a random oracle
with a random seed value s to obtain q, computes pk1−c such that pk0 ⋆ pk1 = q, and sends
pk0 and s to the sender. The latter obtains pk1, uses the public keys to encrypt seeds that are
used to generate one-time pads (using the random oracle), which in turn she uses to encrypt
her respective inputs, and sends the encryptions to the receiver. Intuitively, Property 2 now
prevents the sender from learning the choice bit, while Property 1 ensures that the receiver
learns at most one of the inputs.
Our construction has the following advantages:
• It can be instantiated with several code-based and lattice-based assumptions, namely low
noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC, LWE assumptions. When instantiated with the LPN
or McEliece assumptions, our protocol is several orders of magnitude more efficient than
previous construction that also achieve UC-security [37, 34].
• Our low noise LPN, McEliece and QC-MDPC based instantiations are the first adaptively
secure universally composable OT protocols based on these coding assumptions.
• It can also be instantiated with the CDH assumption. Our framework provides, to the
best of our knowledge, the first UC-secure construction of an oblivious transfer protocol
based on the standard CDH assumption (Simplest OT [26] can only be proven assuming
gap-DH groups).
• Our UC OT protocol based on CDH in the random oracle model with security against
adaptive adversaries has basically the same efficiency as the Simplest OT [26], which is
the most efficient UC OT for the static case but can only be proven secure under gap-DH.
Our protocol with CDH requires the same number of exponentiations as Simplest OT
and only two extra group elements of communication, while being secure against stronger
adversaries under a weaker assumption.
2
Concurrent Work We have recently been made aware of an adaptively secure universally
composable oblivious transfer protocol based on the CDH assumption in the ROM proposed
by Hauck and Loss [62]. Differently from our CDH based construction, which is a corollary
of a more general result, Hauck and Loss build on Diffie-Hellman key exchange to construct
a protocol based on specific properties of the CDH assumption. The authors in [62] were
interested in obtaining efficient 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols. We, on the other hand,
were interested in the case of 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, which is the flavor of oblivious transfer
that finds the most applications in current protocols for secure multiparty computation. Namely,
1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer serves as basis for the currently most efficient oblivious transfer
extension schemes [84, 69], which cheaply provide large numbers of oblivious transfers used
in the currently most efficient commitment [21], two-party computation [85] and multiparty
computation [54, 70] protocols. In this scenario, our CDH based instantiation achieves the same
computational complexity of [62] (requiring 5 modular exponentiations) and requires only 2
extra group elements to be exchanged. In the case of 1-out-of-n oblivious transfer, the protocol
of [62] presents better computational and communication complexities when compared to our
straightforward extension to 1-out-of-n, since it only requires a constant number of modular
exponentiations and the transfer of symmetric ciphertexts with roughly the same length as
the sender’s messages. However, we remark our general framework also yields the currently
most efficient post-quantum constructions under lattice and coding based assumptions for the
1-out-of-2 OT case.
1.2 Related Works
The idea of constructing OT using two public-keys — the “pre-computed” one and the “ran-
domized” one dates back to the CDH-based protocol of Bellare and Micali [9]. It was proven
secure in the stand-alone model, and required zero-knowledge proofs. Naor and Pinkas [81],
in particular,1 presented an improved and enhanced CDH-based protocol in the random ora-
cle model under the same paradigm, however it was proven secure only in the half-simulation
paradigm. It is worth noting that both of the above schemes are tailored for the Diffie-Hellman
groups, and hence generalizing them is not trivial. Dowsley et al. [48] constructed oblivious
transfer using the McEliece encryption and the group operation was bitwise exclusive-or of ma-
trices (representing the public-keys). This construction required an expensive cut-and-choose
technique, which was leveraged by David et al. [37] to show the UC-security of this construction.
Although Mathew et al. [76] showed that the cut-and-choose techniques can be avoided in [48]
without changing the assumptions, Mathew et al. only proved the stand-alone security of their
proposal.
Most of the public-key cryptographic schemes that are deployed nowadays have their security
based on hardness assumptions coming from number theory, such as factoring and computing
discrete logarithms. Likewise, when it comes to (computationally secure) OT protocols, it is
possible to build them based on the hardness of factoring [90, 61] and on Diffie-Hellman assump-
tions [9, 81, 2, 95]. In the UC-security setting, OT protocols can be designed under assumptions
such as: Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) [56, 88], strong RSA [56], Quadractic Residuosity
[88], Decisional Linear (DLIN) [64, 32] and Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) [64, 25].
The Simplest OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi [26], which is proven UC-secure against static
adversaries in the ROM based on the DDH assumption over a gap-DH group, has the same
computational complexity as the CDH-based instantiation of our OT protocol (Section 5.4). On
1They have also presented a DDH-based OT protocol in the standard model, but we require the random oracle
model as a setup assumption, and hence leave this scheme out of scope of our comparison.
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the one hand, our communication complexity is a bit bigger than theirs; on the other hand, it
provides security against adaptive adversaries under a weaker assumption. We would like to
emphasize that although our CDH-based protocol is somewhat similar to the basic protocol by
Naor and Pinkas [81], there are the following two crucial differences: 1) In their protocol, the
sender chooses randomness that is used to “randomize” the receiver’s keys, while in our protocol,
that randomness comes from applying the random oracle to a seed chosen by the receiver him-
self; 2) Our protocol uses a different encryption method for the sender’s messages, in particular,
the ElGamal encryption is employed, which is not the case in their protocol. It is exactly those
differences that allow us to leverage stronger security guarantees (UC-security) as compared to
the Naor-Pinkas protocol (half-simulation security).
It has been known for more than two decades that Shor’s algorithm [93] makes factoring and
computing discrete logarithms easy for quantum computers. Therefore, an important pending
problem concerns designing post-quantum OT protocols. One solution is to rely on statistically
secure protocols (i.e., those not depending on any computational assumption and thus secure
even if full-scale quantum computers become reality) based on assumptions such as the existence
of noisy channels [28, 27, 30, 94, 29, 82, 89, 1, 47], pre-distributed correlated data [6, 92, 82],
cryptogates [71, 7], the bounded storage model [16, 38, 42, 43] and on hardware tokens [40, 46].
Nonetheless, these constructions (except the ones based on a trusted initializer) are rather im-
practical. Thus, it seems reasonable to focus on obtaining OT protocols based on computational
problems that are believed to be hard even for quantum computers: such as, for instance, the
Learning from Parity with Noise (LPN), the Learning with Errors (LWE), and the McEliece
problems.
The LPN problem essentially states that given a system of binary linear equations, in which
the outputs are disturbed by some noise, it is difficult to determine the solution. It is very simple
to generate LPN samples, however finding the solution seems to be very hard [14, 75, 74, 73].
Therefore it is an attractive assumption that has been widely used for symmetric cryptographic
primitives [63, 65, 59, 4, 68, 72]. It has seen far less usage in asymmetric cryptographic primitives.
However, public-key encryption schemes [3, 33, 41] were designed based on the LPN variant
introduced by Alekhnovich [3], which has low noise but only provides a linear amount of samples.
An OT protocol was also designed based on this variant of LPN [34]. However, this protocol is
based on cut-and-choose techniques, which require a number of key generation, encryption and
decryption operations linear in the cut-and-choose statistical security parameter. On the other
hand, the instantiation of our OT protocol using this LPN variant (Section 5.3) is far more
efficient.
The LWE problem is a generalization of the LPN problem that was introduced by Oded Regev
[91]. It is as hard to solve as some lattice problems and is one of the most versatile assumptions
used in cryptography (e.g., [91, 58, 23, 15, 5, 18]). Peikert et al. [88] proposed a framework
for realizing efficient, round-optimal UC-secure OT protocols that can be instantiated based on
LWE. Their framework works in the CRS model. The main bulding block of this framework is a
dual-mode encryption, which Peikert et al. built from a multi-bit version of Regev’s IND-CPA
cryptosystem. Their final instantiation requires two key generations, two encryptions and one
decryption with the basic IND-CPA cryptosystem. We employ the same basic cryptosystem in
our LWE instantiation but perform one less key generation.
McEliece [77] introduced a public-key encryption scheme based on hardness of the syndrome
decoding problem. The cryptosystem proposed by Niederreiter [83] is its dual. Later on, IND-
CPA-secure [86, 87] and IND-CCA2-secure [45, 55, 39] variants of these schemes were introduced.
Both stand-alone [49, 50, 76] as well as fully-simulatable [35, 36] and UC-secure [37] OT protocols
can be built using these cryptosystems. As in the case of low noise LPN, most of these protocols
4
(and all UC-secure ones) are based on cut-and-choose techniques, which require a number of
key generation, encryption and decryption operations linear in the cut-and-choose statistical
security parameter. At the same time, our construction uses a small constant number of these
operations. All the above advanced constructions assume pseudorandomness of the public-keys
of the McEliece and Niederreiter PKE’s. Our OT protocol based on the McEliece encryption
scheme (Section 5.1) is far more efficient than the ones using cut-and-choose techniques.
A number of adaptively secure universally composable oblivious transfer protocols have been
proposed in current literature [20, 11, 13, 25, 57, 12, 24]. Most of these protocols are on the
CRS model and on erasures in order to achieve adaptive security. Moreover, these protocols
require more than 2 rounds and rely either on complex zero-knowledge proof techniques or
on adaptively secure universally composable commitments as central building blocks of their
constructions. On the other hand, our generic construction does not assume secure erasures and
requires solely a simple OW-CPA secure cryptosystem and can be executed in 2 rounds, which
is optimal. Moreover, by avoiding heavy primitives such as adaptively secure UC commitments
and zero-knowledge proofs, we achieve much better concrete computational and communication
complexities. Besides this stark contrast in efficiency, our results show that adaptively secure UC
OT can be achieved under much weaker assumptions in the random oracle model in comparison
to the CRS model.
It is a well-known fact that UC-secure OT protocols require some setup assumption [19].
Our protocols use the random oracle model as such. Alternative setup assumptions that can
be used to obtain UC-secure OT protocols include the common reference string (CRS) model
[20, 56, 88], the public-key infrastructure model [31], the existence of noisy channels [44, 51],
and tamper-proof hardware [67, 40, 46].
2 Preliminaries
We denote by κ the security parameter. Let y
$
← F (x) denote running the randomized algorithm
F with input x and random coins, and obtaining the output y. Similarly, y ← F (x) is used
for a deterministic algorithm. For a set X , let x
$
← X denote x chosen uniformly at random
from X ; and for a distribution Y, let y
$
← Y denote y sampled according to the distribution Y.
Let F2 denote the finite field with 2 elements. For A,B ∈ F
m×n
2 , A ⊕ B denotes their element-
wise exclusive-or. For a parameter ρ, χρ denotes the Bernoulli distribution that outputs 1 with
probability ρ. Let HW(e) denote the Hamming weight of a vector e, i.e., the number of its
non-zero positions. We will denote by negl(κ) the set of negligible functions of κ. We abbreviate
probabilistic polynomial time as PPT.
2.1 Encryption Schemes
The main building block used in our OT protocol is a public-key encryption scheme. Such a
scheme, denoted as PKE, has public-key PK, secret-key SK, message M, randomness R and
ciphertext C spaces that are functions of the security parameter κ, and consists of the following
three algorithms KG, Enc, Dec:
• The PPT key generation algorithm KG takes as input the security parameter 1κ and
outputs a pair of public pk ∈ PK and secret sk ∈ SK keys.
• The PPT encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public-key pk ∈ PK, a message
m ∈ M and randomness r ∈ R and outputs a ciphertext ct ∈ C. We denote this operation
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by Enc(pk,m, r). When r is not explcitly given as input, it is assumed to be sampled
uniformly at random from R.
• The (deterministic) decryption algorithm Dec takes as input the secret-key sk ∈ SK and
a ciphertext ct ∈ C and outputs either a message m ∈ M or an error symbol ⊥. For
(pk, sk)
$
← KG(1κ), any m ∈ M, and c
$
← Enc(pk,m), it should hold that Dec(sk, ct) = m
with overwhelming probability over the randomness used by the algorithms.
We should emphasize that for some encryption schemes not all p˜k ∈ PK are “valid” in the
sense of being a possible output of KG. The same holds for c˜t ∈ C in relation to Enc and all
possible coins and messages.
Next we define the notion of one-wayness against chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA).
Definition 2.1 (OW-CPA security) A PKE is OW-CPA secure if for every PPT adversary
A, and for (pk, sk)
$
← KG(1κ), m
$
←M and ct
$
← Enc(pk,m), it holds that
Pr[A(pk, ct) = m] ∈ negl(κ).
Our OT constructions use as a building block a PKE that satisfies a variant of the OW-CPA
security notion: informally, two random messages are encrypted under two different public-keys,
one of which can be chosen by the adversary (but he does not have total control over both
public-keys). His goal is then to recover both messages and this should be difficult. Formally,
this property is captured by the following definition.
Property 2.2 Consider the public-key encryption scheme PKE and the security parameter κ.
It is assumed that PK forms a group with operation denoted by “⋆”. For every PPT two-stage
adversary A = (A1,A2) running the following experiment:
q
$
← PK
(pk1, pk2, st)
$
← A1(q) such that pk1, pk2 ∈ PK and pk1 ⋆ pk2 = q
mi
$
←M for i = 1, 2
cti
$
← Enc(pki,mi) for i = 1, 2
(m˜1, m˜2)
$
← A1(ct1, ct2, st)
it holds that
Pr[(m˜1, m˜2) = (m1,m2)] ∈ negl(κ).
We also need a property about indistinguishability of a public-key generated using KG and
an element sampled uniformly at random from PK.
Property 2.3 Consider the public-key encryption scheme PKE and the security parameter κ.
Let (pk, sk)
$
← KG(1κ) and pk′
$
← PK. For every PPT distinguisher A, it holds that
|Pr[A(pk) = 1]− Pr[A(pk′) = 1]| ∈ negl(κ).
In Section 5, we describe some cryptosystems for which Properties 2.2 and 2.3 are believed
to hold and thus they can be used to instantiate our OT protocol.
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2.2 Universal Composability
We prove our protocols secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework introduced by
Canetti in [17]. In this section, we present a brief description of the UC framework originally
given in [22] and refer interested readers to [17] for further details. In this framework, protocol
security is analyzed under the real-world/ideal-world paradigm, i.e., by comparing the real world
execution of a protocol with an ideal world interaction with the primitive that it implements.
The model includes a composition theorem, that basically states that UC secure protocols can
be arbitrarily composed with each other without any security compromises. This desirable
property not only allows UC secure protocols to effectively serve as building blocks for complex
applications but also guarantees security in practical environments, where several protocols (or
individual instances of protocols) are executed in parallel, such as the Internet.
In the UC framework, the entities involved in both the real and ideal world executions are
modeled as PPT Interactive Turing Machines (ITM) that receive and deliver messages through
their input and output tapes, respectively. In the ideal world execution, dummy parties (possibly
controlled by an ideal adversary S referred to as the simulator) interact directly with the ideal
functionality F , which works as a trusted third party that computes the desired primitive. In the
real world execution, several parties (possibly corrupted by a real world adversary A) interact
with each other by means of a protocol π that realizes the ideal functionality. The real and
ideal executions are controlled by the environment Z, an entity that delivers inputs and reads
the outputs of the individual parties, the adversary A and the simulator S. After a real or ideal
execution, Z outputs a bit, which is considered as the output of the execution. The rationale
behind this framework lies in showing that the environment Z (that represents everything that
happens outside of the protocol execution) is not able to efficiently distinguish between the
real and ideal executions, thus implying that the real world protocol is as secure as the ideal
functionality.
We denote by REALπ,A,Z(κ, z, r¯) the output of the environment Z in the real-world exe-
cution of a protocol π between n parties with an adversary A under security parameter κ,
input z and randomness r¯ = (rZ , rA, rP1 , . . . , rPn), where (z, rZ), rA and rPi are respectively
related to Z, A and party i. Analogously, we denote by IDEALF ,S,Z(κ, z, r¯) the output of the
environment in the ideal interaction between the simulator S and the ideal functionality F
under security parameter κ, input z and randomness r¯ = (rZ , rS , rF ), where (z, rZ), rS and
rF are respectively related to Z, S and F . The real world execution and the ideal execu-
tions are respectively represented by the ensembles REALπ,A,Z = {REALπ,A,Z(κ, z, r¯)}κ∈N and
IDEALF ,S,Z = {IDEALF ,S,Z(κ, z, r¯)}κ∈N with z ∈ {0, 1}
∗ and a uniformly chosen r¯.
In addition to these two models of computation, the UC framework also considers the G-
hybrid world, where the computation proceeds as in the real-world with the additional assump-
tion that the parties have access to an auxiliary ideal functionality G. In this model, honest
parties do not communicate with the ideal functionality directly, but instead the adversary de-
livers all the messages to and from the ideal functionality. We consider the communication
channels to be ideally authenticated, so that the adversary may read but not modify these
messages. Unlike messages exchanged between parties, which can be read by the adversary,
the messages exchanged between parties and the ideal functionality are divided into a public
header and a private header. The public header can be read by the adversary and contains
non-sensitive information (such as session identifiers, type of message, sender and receiver). On
the other hand, the private header cannot be read by the adversary and contains information
such as the parties’ private inputs. We denote the ensemble of environment outputs that repre-
sents an execution of a protocol π in a G-hybrid model as HYBRIDGπ,A,Z (defined analogously to
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REALπ,A,Z). UC security is then formally defined as:
Definition 2.4 An n-party (n ∈ N) protocol π is said to UC-realize an ideal functionality F
in the G-hybrid model if, for every adversary A, there exists a simulator S such that, for every
environment Z, the following relation holds:
IDEALF ,S,Z ≈ HYBRID
G
π,A,Z
We say that a protocol is statistically secure, if the same holds for all Z with unbounded com-
puting power.
2.2.1 Adversarial Model:
We consider a malicious adversary, which can deviate from the prescribed protocol in an arbitrary
way. We call the adversary static, if he has to corrupt parties before execution starts and the
corrupted (or honest) parties remain as such throughout the execution. We call the adversary
adaptive, if he is able corrupt parties at any point in the protocol execution, and even after it.
2.2.2 Oblivious Transfer Ideal Functionality:
The basic 1-out-of-2 string oblivious transfer functionality FOT as defined in [20] is presented in
Figure 1.
Functionality FOT.
FOT interacts with a sender Alice and a receiver Bob. The lengths of the strings λ is fixed and known
to both parties. FOT proceeds as follows:
• Upon receiving a message (sender, sid, ~x0, ~x1) from Alice, where each ~xi ∈ {0, 1}
λ, store the
tuple (sid, ~x0, ~x1). Ignore further messages from Alice with the same sid.
• Upon receiving a message (receiver, sid, c) from Bob, where c ∈ {0, 1}, check if a tuple
(sid, ~x0, ~x1) was recorded. If yes, send (received, sid, ~xc) to Bob and (received, sid) to Alice
and halt. Otherwise, send nothing to Bob, but continue running.
Figure 1: Functionality FOT.
2.2.3 Setup Assumptions:
Our constructions rely on the random oracle model [10], which can be modelled in the UC
framework as the FRO-hybrid model. The random oracle functionality FRO is presented in
Figure 2. Our construction will actually use two instances of FRO: FRO1 with range PK and
FRO2 with range {0, 1}
λ.
3 Oblivious Transfer Protocol
In this section, we introduce our 1-out-of-2 OT protocol and prove its UC security against static
malicious adversaries in the FRO-hybrid model (i.e., the random oracle model). Our protocol
uses as a building block a public-key encryption scheme that satisfies Properties 2.2 and 2.3
(defined in Section 2.1). The high-level idea is that Bob picks two public-keys pk0, pk1 such that
he only knows the secret key corresponding to pkc (where c is his choice bit) and hands them to
8
Functionality FRO
FRO is parameterized by a range D. FRO keeps a list L of pairs of values, which is initially empty,
and proceeds as follows:
• Upon receiving a value (sid,m) from a party Pi or from S, if there is a pair (m, hˆ) in the list
L, set h = hˆ. Otherwise, choose h
$
← D and store the pair (m,h) in L. Reply to the activating
machine with (sid, h).
Figure 2: Functionality FRO.
Alice. She then uses the two public-keys to transmit the messages in an encrypted way, so that
Bob can only recover the message, for which he knows the secret-key skc.
A crucial point in such schemes is making sure that Bob is only able to decrypt one of
the messages. In order to enforce this property, our protocol relies on Property 2.2 and uses
the random oracle to force the element q to be chosen uniformly at random from PK. After
generating the pair of secret and public key (skc, pkc), Bob samples a seed s, queries the random
oracle FRO1 to obtain q and computes pk1−c such that pk0 ⋆ pk1 = q. Bob then hands the
public-key pk0 and the seed s to Alice, enabling her to also compute pk1. Since the public-keys
are indistinguishable according to Property 2.3, Alice learns nothing about Bob’s choice bit.
Next, Alice picks two uniformly random strings p0, p1, queries them to the random oracle FRO2
obtaining p′0, p
′
1 as response, and computes one-time pad encryptions of her messages m0,m1 as
m′0 = m0⊕ p
′
0 and m
′
1 = m1⊕ p
′
1. Alice also encrypts p0 and p1 under pk0 and pk1, respectively,
to obtain ct0 and ct1. Alice sends (m
′
1,m
′
2, ct0, ct1) to Bob. Bob can use skc to decrypt ctc
obtaining pc. He then queries pc to the random oracle FRO2 obtaining p
′
c as response, and
retrieves mc = m
′
c ⊕ p
′
c. Due to Property 2.2, Bob will not be able to recover p1−c in order
to query it to the random oracle and to decrypt m′1−c. Therefore, the security for Alice is also
guaranteed.
Our protocol πOT is described in Figure 3. It can be instantiated using different public-key
encryption schemes as described in Section 5.
3.1 Security Analysis
We now formally state the security of πOT .
Theorem 3.1 Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme that satisfies Properties 2.2 and 2.3.
When instantiated with PKE, the protocol πOT UC-realizes the functionality FOT against static
adversaries in the FRO-hybrid model.
Proof: In order to prove the security of πOT , we must construct a simulator S such that no
environment Z can distinguish between interactions with an adversary A in the real world and
with S in the ideal world. For the sake of clarity, we will describe the simulator S separately
for the case where only Bob is corrupted and the case where only Alice is corrupted. In both
cases, S writes all the messages received from Z in A’s input tape, simulating A’s environment.
Also, S writes all messages from A’s output tape to its own output tape, forwarding them to Z.
Notice that simulating the cases where both Alice and Bob are honest or corrupted is trivial. If
both are corrupted, S simply runs A internally. In this case, A will generate the messages from
both corrupted parties. If neither Alice nor Bob are corrupted, S runs the protocol between
honest Alice and Bob internally on the inputs provided by Z and all messages are delivered to
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Protocol πOT
Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme that satisfies Properties 2.2 and 2.3, and κ be the
security parameter. Protocol πOT is executed between Alice with inputs m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}
λ and Bob
with input c ∈ {0, 1}. They interact with each other and with two instances of the random oracle
ideal functionality FRO (FRO1 with range PK and FRO2 with range {0, 1}
λ), proceeding as follows:
1. Bob generates a pair of keys (pkc, skc)
$
← KG(1κ). He samples a random string s
$
← {0, 1}κ and
sends (sid, s) to FRO1, obtaining (sid, q) as answer. Bob computes pk1−c such that pk0⋆pk1 = q
and sends (s, pk0) to Alice.
2. Upon receiving (s, pk0), Alice:
(a) Queries FRO1 with (sid, s), obtaining (sid, q) in response.
(b) Computes pk1 such that pk0 ⋆ pk1 = q.
(c) Samples p0, p1
$
← {0, 1}κ and queries FRO2 with (sid, p0) and (sid, p1), obtaining (sid, p
′
0)
and (sid, p′1) as answers.
(d) Computes m′0 = p
′
0 ⊕m0, m
′
1 = p
′
1 ⊕m1, ct0
$
← Enc(pk0, p0) and ct1
$
← Enc(pk1, p1).
(e) Sends (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) to Bob and halts.
3. Bob computes pc ← Dec(skc, ctc). If decryption fails, Bob outputs mc
$
← {0, 1}λ and halts. If
decryption succeeds Bob queries FRO2 with (sid, pc), obtaining (sid, p
′
c) as answer. He then
outputs mc = m
′
c ⊕ p
′
c.
Figure 3: Protocol πOT
A. As for the correctness, notice that pc is encrypted under public key pkc, for which Bob knows
the corresponding secret key skc. Hence, Bob can successfully recover pc from ctc and use it to
obtain p′c from FRO. This enables Bob to retrieve mc from m
′
c by computing mc = m
′
c ⊕ p
′
c.
Simulator for a corrupted Bob: In the case where only Bob is corrupted, the simulator
S interacts with FOT and an internal copy A of the real world adversary (S acts as Alice in
this internal simulated execution of the protocol). Additionally, S also plays the role of FRO1
and FRO2 to A. The goal of the simulator is to extract Bob’s choice bit in order to request
the correct message from FOT. In order to do so, S first executes the same steps of an honest
Alice in πOT with the difference that it picks uniformly random values for m
′
0,m
′
1 instead of
computing them. Since S plays the role of FRO2 to A, it learns Bob’s choice bit when it receives
a query (sid, pc) from A (originally meant for FRO2 in the real world). Since A can only query
the random oracle FRO1 in a polynomial number of points to obtain q, an A that queries FRO2
with p1−c (thus tricking S into extracting the wrong choice bit) can be trivially used to break
Property 2.2. Knowing c, S obtains mc from FOT and answers A’s query to FRO2 with (sid, p
′
c)
such that p′c = m
′
c ⊕mc. The simulator S for the case where only Bob is corrupted is presented
in Figure 4.
Notice that unless the simulator S aborts, it perfectly emulates the execution of the real protocol
for A. Hence, an environment can distinguish the real world execution from the ideal world
simulation only if: (1) p0 or p1 is queried to FRO2 before the simulator sends the encrypted
messages; or (2) A queries both p0 or p1 to FRO2. The first event can only happen with negligible
probability as p0 and p1 are uniformly random strings of length κ and the PPT adversary A
can only make a polynomial number of queries to the random oracle. The probability of the
second event is polynomially related with the probability of breaking Property 2.2. Thus, a PPT
environment Z cannot distinguish an interaction with S in the ideal world from an interaction
with A in the real world except with negligible probability.
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Simulator S (Corrupted Bob)
Let λ be the length of the messages and κ be the security parameter. The simulator S interacts with
an environment Z, functionality FOT and an internal copy A of the adversary that corrupts only
Bob, proceeding as follows:
1. S simulates the answers to the random oracle queries from A exactly as FRO1 and FRO2 would
(and stores the lists of queries/answers), except when stated otherwise in S’s description.
2. Upon receiving (s, pk0) from A, S proceeds as follows:
(a) Checks if there is a pair (s, q) in the simulated list of FRO1. If not, S samples q
$
← PK
and stores (s, q) in it. S computes pk1 such that pk0 ⋆ pk1 = q.
(b) Samples m′0,m
′
1
$
← {0, 1}λ, p0, p1
$
← {0, 1}κ. If p0 or p1 has already been queried to
FRO2, S aborts. Otherwise, S computes ct0
$
← Enc(pk0, p0) and ct1
$
← Enc(pk1, p1), and
sends (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) to A.
3. S resumes answering the random oracle queries from A as above, except for the queries p0
and p1 to FRO2. Upon receiving such query pc, S queries FOT with (receiver, sid, c), receiving
(received, sid,mc) in response. S answers A’s query with the value m
′
c ⊕mc. After this point,
if A queries p1−c to FRO2, S aborts. When A halts, S also halts and outputs whatever A
outputs.
Figure 4: Simulator S for the case where only Bob is corrupted.
Simulator for a corrupted Alice: In the case where only Alice is corrupted, the simulator
S interacts with FOT and an internal copy A of the real world adversary (S acts as Bob in this
internal simulated execution of the protocol). Additionally, S also plays the role of FRO1 and
FRO2 to A. The goal of the simulator is to extract both messages m0,m1 of the receiver in
order to deliver them to FOT. In order to do so, S has to trick A into accepting two public-
keys pk0, pk1 for which S knows the corresponding secret-keys sk0, sk1. S generates two secret
and public-key pairs (pk0, sk0)
$
← KG(1κ) and (pk1, sk1)
$
← KG(1κ). Additionally, S generates
a random seed s
$
← {0, 1}κ and sends (s, pk0) to Bob. When A queries FRO1 with (sid, s),
S answers with (sid, pk0 ⊕ pk1), thus making A fix pk1 for which S knows the corresponding
secret-key sk1. Upon receiving (m
′
0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) from A, S uses sk0 and sk1 to decrypt both ct0
and ct1 and obtain p0 and p1 (respectively), thus enabling it to recover both messages of Alice.
If the decryption of cti fails, S samples a random mi
$
← {0, 1}λ. The simulator S for the case
where only Alice is corrupted is presented in Figure 5.
The only points where the simulation differs from the real world protocol execution are in the
sampling of two public-keys pk0, pk1 for which S knows the corresponding secret-keys and in the
answer (sid, pk0⊕ pk1) to the query (sid, s) from A to (the simulated) FRO1. Notice that due to
Property 2.3, a public-key outputted by KG is indistinguishable from a key sampled uniformly
at random from PK. Hence, the choice of public-keys in the simulation is indistinguishable
from that of the real world protocol execution. The only way the simulation can still fail is
if A queries FRO1 with (sid, s) before pk0, pk1 are chosen by S, which happens with negligible
probability. Thus, a PPT environment Z cannot distinguish an interaction with S in the ideal
world from an interaction with A in the real world except with negligible probability.
3.2 Obtaining 1-out-of-k OT
Our OT protocol can be easily extend to obtain 1-out-of-k OT, i.e., Alice has k input strings
and Bob can learn one of the strings that he chooses. The idea is that there are k public-
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Simulator S (Corrupted Alice)
Let λ be the length of messages and κ be a security parameter. Simulator S interacts with an
environment Z, functionality FOT and an internal copy A of the adversary that corrupts only Alice,
proceeding as follows:
1. S simulates the answers to the random oracle queries from A exactly as FRO1 and FRO2 would
(and stores the lists of queries/answers), except when stated otherwise in S’s description.
2. S generates two secret and public-key pairs (pk0, sk0)
$
← KG(1κ) and (pk1, sk1)
$
← KG(1κ). S
samples s
$
← {0, 1}κ and aborts if s has been already queried to FRO1. S sends (s, pk0) to A.
3. When A queries FRO1 with (sid, s), S answers with (sid, pk0 ⊕ pk1).
4. Upon receiving (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1), S proceeds as follows:
(a) Decrypts ct0 and ct1, getting p0 ← Dec(sk0, ct0) and p1 ← Dec(sk1, ct1). If the decryption
of cti failed, S samplesmi
$
← {0, 1}λ. Otherwise, S recovers p′
i
from the list (pi, p
′
i
) stored
for FRO2 (or samples p
′
i
$
← {0, 1}λ and stores the new pair if such a pair does not exist
yet) and computes both messages m0 = m
′
0 ⊕ p
′
0 and m1 = m
′
0 ⊕ p
′
0.
(b) S sends (sender, sid,m0,m1) to FOT.
5. When A halts, S also halts and outputs whatever A outputs.
Figure 5: Simulator S for the case where only Alice is corrupted.
keys (pk0, . . . , pkk−1) that are used to encrypted the strings using the same technique as be-
fore. In the modified protocol, Bob generates a pair of keys (pkc, skc)
$
← KG(1κ) for his choice
value c ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. He also samples a random string s
$
← {0, 1}κ and sends the queries
(sid, s‖1), . . . , (sid, s‖k − 1) to FRO1, obtaining (sid, q1), . . . , (sid, qk−1) as answers. Bob then
computes all pki for i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} \ c in such way that pk0 ⋆ pkj = qj for j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
He sends (s, pk0) to Alice. She uses the answers to the same random oracle queries as well as
pk0 to reconstruct (pk0, . . . , pkk−1).
4 Adaptive Security
In this section we show that Protocol πOT is secure against adaptive adversaries. In the case
of adaptive corruptions, the simulator has to handle adversaries that corrupt parties after the
protocol execution has started, potentially after the execution is finished. When a party is
corrupted in the ideal world, the simulator learns its inputs (and possibly outputs) and needs to
hand it to its internal copy of the adversary along with the internal state of the dummy party (run
internally by the simulator) corresponding to the corrupted party. This internal state must be
consistent with both the inputs learned upon corruption and the messages already sent between
dummy parties in the simulation. Usually it is hard to construct a simulator capable of doing so
because it must first simulate a protocol execution with its internal copy of the adversary without
knowing the inputs of uncorrupted parties and later, if a corruption happens, it must generate
an internal state for the corrupted dummy party that is consistent with the newly learned inputs
and the protocol messages that have already been generated. Intuitively, this requirement means
that the simulator must simulate “non-committing” messages for honest dummy parties such
that, upon corruption, it can generate randomness that would lead an honest party executing
the protocol to generate the messages sent up to that point had it been given the inputs obtained
form the ideal world party.
In order to prove that Protocol πOT is indeed secure against adaptive adversaries, we will
construct a simulator that generates messages in its internal execution with a copy of the adver-
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sary such that it can later come up with randomness that would result in these messages being
generated given any input to any of the parties. The general structure of this simulator is very
similar to the simulator for the static case, using the same techniques for extracting inputs. The
main modification in the simulator lies in the case where both the Alice and Bob are honest. In
the proof of security against adaptive adversaries, the simulator no longer handles this case by
simulating an interaction between two internal dummy parties running the protocol on random
inputs. Instead, the simulator generates the first message (from Bob to Alice) by acting as in the
static case of a corrupted sender and the second message (from Alice to Bob) by acting as in the
static case of a corrupted receiver. From the proof of static security, this obviously generates
a view that is indistinguishable from a real execution of the protocol. However, now the first
message (s, pk0) is such that both pk0 and pk1 (as defined by the protocol) are valid public-keys.
Similarly, the second message (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) contains random m
′
0,m
′
1 and ct0, ct1 containing
p0, p1 that haven’t yet been queried to FRO2.
Having these messages generated in simulating an execution between honest Alice and Bob
will allow the simulator to “explain” the randomness used in an execution in case of an adaptive
corruption. In the case of an adaptive corruption of Bob, the simulator can hand the state
of Bob upon corruption to its internally executed adversary by simply giving the adversary
c,(pkc, skc),s,(sid, q), pk1−c and the random coins of KG(1
κ) when generating (pkc, skc), given c
revealed when the the ideal world Bob is corrupted. Since both pk0 and pk1 are valid and a valid
public-key is indistinguishable from an invalid one, the state is consistent with c. In the case
of an adaptive corruption of Alice, the simulator obtains (m0,m1) by corrupting the ideal world
Alice, sets the answers (sid, p′0) and (sid, p
′
1) to queries (sid, p0) and (sid, p1) to the simulated
FRO2 such that m
′
0 = p
′
0⊕m0,m
′
1 = p
′
1⊕m1, and finally hands Alice’s state to the adversary as
m0,m1, pk0, pk1 (computed as in the protocol), p0, p1, p
′
0, p
′
1 and message (m
′
0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1).
Theorem 4.1 Let PKE be a public-key encryption scheme that satisfies Properties 2.2 and 2.3.
When instantiated with PKE, Protocol πOT UC-realizes the functionality FOT against adaptive
adversaries in the FRO-hybrid model.
Proof: As in the case of an static adversary, we must construct a simulator S such that no
environment Z can distinguish between interactions with an adversary A in the real world and
with S in the ideal world. For the sake of clarity, we will describe the simulator S separately
for the different corruption scenarios. In all cases, S writes all the messages received from Z in
A’s input tape, simulating A’s environment. Also, S writes all messages from A’s output tape
to its own output tape, forwarding them to Z.
First we handle the four cases corresponding to the corruption statuses (i.e. corrupted or hon-
est) of Alice and Bob before the execution starts:
Case 1: Both Alice and Bob are honest: This case is the main point where the simulator for
an adaptive adversary changes in relation to the static adversary case. In this case, the simulator
will simulate an execution between honest Alice and Bob using random inputs. The easiest way
to perform this simulation is to run the protocol exactly as honest parties would when given
random inputs, which is the done in the proof of Theorem 3.1. However, for handling adaptive
corruptions, the simulator will generate “non-committing” messages for honest dummy parties
in such a way that the simulated execution is indistinguishable from a real execution and that
the simulator can later generate consistent randomness to claim that honest parties had been ex-
ecuting the protocol with an arbitrary input. The simulator for this case is described in Figure 6.
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Simulator S (Honest Alice and Bob)
Let λ be the length of the messages and κ be the security parameter. The simulator S interacts with
an environment Z, functionality FOT and an internal copy A of the adversary that does not corrupt
Alice or Bob, only observing their interaction and querying FRO1 and FRO2. S proceeds as follows:
1. S simulates the answers to the random oracle queries from A exactly as FRO1 and FRO2 would
(and stores the lists of queries/answers), except when stated otherwise in S’s description.
2. Simulating the first message (from dummy Bob):
(a) S generates two secret and public key pairs (pk0, sk0)
$
← KG(1κ) and (pk1, sk1)
$
← KG(1κ).
S samples s
$
← {0, 1}κ and aborts if s has been already queried to FRO1. S sends (s, pk0)
to the dummy Alice.
(b) When A queries FRO1 with (sid, s), S answers with (sid, pk0 ⊕ pk1).
3. Simulating the second message (from dummy Alice):
(a) Samples m′0,m
′
1
$
← {0, 1}λ, p0, p1
$
← {0, 1}κ and r0, r1
$
← R. If p0 or p1 has already
been queried to FRO2, S aborts. Otherwise, S computes ct0 ← Enc(pk0, p0, r0) and
ct1 ← Enc(pk1, p1, r1), and sends (m
′
0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) to dummy Bob.
4. S resumes answering the random oracle queries from A as above, except for the queries p0 and
p1 to FRO2. Upon receiving such query pc, S aborts. When A halts, S also halts and outputs
whatever A outputs.
Figure 6: Simulator S for the case where both Alice and Bob are honest.
Case 2: Alice is corrupted and Bob is honest: This case is equivalent to an execution with
a static adversary that corrupts only Alice. Hence, the simulator proceeds as in the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
Case 3: Alice is honest and Bob is corrupted: This case is equivalent to an execution with
a static adversary that corrupts only Bob. Hence, the simulator proceeds as in the proof of
Theorem 3.1.
Case 4: Both Alice and Bob are corrupted: This case is equivalent to an execution with
a static adversary that corrupts both Alice and Bob. Hence, the simulator proceeds as in the
proof of Theorem 3.1.
Now we analyze the adaptive corruption cases. Notice that the simulator proceeds to simulate
as in the static case after handing the internal state of the corrupted dummy party to the ad-
versary. This is the case because the messages generated by the simulator for honest dummy
parties already allow the simulator to continue simulating using the same instructions. In the
case of a corrupted Alice, the message (s, pk0) generated for the dummy receiver is already such
that both pk0 and pk1 (if computed as in the protocol) are valid public-keys for which the sim-
ulator knows the corresponding secret-keys, allowing it to extract the adversary’s messages. In
the case of a corrupted Bob, the message (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) generated for the dummy sender is
already such that p0 or p1 have not been queried to FRO2, allowing the simulator to set the
answer to these queries in such a way that mc = m
′
c⊕ p
′
c for any arbitrary mc ∈ {0, 1}
λ and any
c ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, we focus describing how the simulator generates the internal states of dummy
Alice and dummy Bob in case the adversary chooses to corrupt them during the simulation. We
will handle the cases of adaptive corruptions of Alice and Bob separately.
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Adaptive corruption of Alice: When Alice is corrupted in the ideal world, S obtains its input
(m0,m1). In the simulated execution with its internal copy of the adversary A, S must return
both the input and a consistent internal state for the dummy Alice. We further divide this
scenario in two cases regarding the point of the execution when Alice becomes corrupted:
• Before the second message (sent by Alice): In this case, dummy Alice’s internal state
consists solely of the inputs (m0,m1). S returns (m0,m1) to A.
• After the second message (sent by Alice): In this case, S must return to A both the input
(m0,m1) and the internal state of dummy Alice in a way that it is consistent with both
the input and the message (m′0,m
′
1, ct0, ct1) sent by dummy Alice. In both the cases of
an honest Bob and of a dishonest Bob, the second message is computed by S in the same
way and it knows p0, p1. Hence, S computes p
′
0 = m
′
0 ⊕m0, p
′
1 = m
′
1 ⊕m1 and returns
(m0,m1, pk1, p0, p1, p
′
0, p
′
1, r0, r1) to A as the dummy Alice’s state. Furthermore, if A queries
FRO2 with pi, for i ∈ {0, 1}, answers with the value m
′
i ⊕mi.
If Bob is honest, S continues the simulation from the point where the corruption happened as in
Case 2 (where only Alice is corrupted). Otherwise, it continues as in Case 4 (where both Alice
and Bob are corrupted).
Adaptive corruption of Bob: When Bob is corrupted in the ideal world, S obtains its input
c. In the simulated execution with its internal copy of the adversary A, S must return both the
input and a consistent internal state for the dummy Bob. We further divide this scenario in two
cases regarding the point of the execution when Bob becomes corrupted:
• Before the first message (sent by Bob): In this case, dummy Bob’s internal state consists
solely of the input c. S returns c to A.
• Between the first message (sent by Bob) and the second message (sent by Alice): In this
case, S must return to A both the input c and the internal state of dummy Bob in such a
way that it is consistent with both the input and the first message (s, pk0) sent by dummy
Bob. In both the cases of an honest Alice and of a dishonest Alice, the first message is
computed by S in the same way and he knows both key pairs (pk0, sk0) and (pk1, sk1), as
well as the randomness used to generate each of them. Hence, S computes q = pk0 ⊕ pk1
and returns (c, skc, pkc, rc, q, pk1−c) to A as the internal state of dummy Bob, where rc is
the randomness used by (pkc, skc)
$
← KG(1κ). Notice that in the case where Alice and Bob
are honest as well as in the case where only Alice is corrupted, S would answer a query
(sid, s) to FRO1 with (sid, q), where q = pk0 ⊕ pk1. Hence, when A queries FRO1 with
(sid, s), S consistently answers with (sid, q).
• After the second message (sent by Alice): In this case, S also obtains Bob’s outputmc in the
ideal world. Hence, S must return to A the input c, randomness that is consistent with the
first message and, additionally, randomness that is consistent with the second message.
The first message does not depend on the output, so S computes (skc, pkc, rc, q, pk1−c)
and handles queries to FRO1 as in the previous case. If Alice is corrupted, S retrieves
(pc, p
′
c) from the internal list of the simulated FRO2 (since either A or S made this query).
Otherwise, if Alice is honest, S sets p′c = m
′
c⊕mc. Finally, S returns (skc, pkc, rc, q, pk1−c, p
′
c)
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to A as dummy Bob’s internal state. Furthermore, upon receiving a query pc from A to
FRO2, S answers with the value m
′
c ⊕mc.
If Alice is honest, S continues the simulation from the point where the corruption happened as
in Case 3 (where only Bob is corrupted). Otherwise, it continues as in Case 4 (where both Alice
and Bob are corrupted).
5 Instantiations of the OT Protocol
5.1 Instantiation Based on the McEliece Cryptosystem
Let n, k and t be functions of the security parameter κ (for easy of readability this will not be
explicit in the notation). Consider a linear-error correcting code C with length n and dimension
k, which consists of a k-dimensional subspace of Fn2 , and let G ∈ F
k×n
2 denote the generator
matrix of C. For the parameters n, k and t, the assumption on the hardness of the bounded
decoding problem can be stated as follows.
Assumption 5.1 For parameters n, k and t that are functions of the security parameter κ,
sample the generator matrix G
$
← Fk×n2 , the message x
$
← Fk2 and a uniformly random error
e ∈ Fn2 such that HW(e) = t. Then for y = xG ⊕ e and for every PPT decoder A
Pr[A(G, y) = x] ∈ negl(κ).
We next prove some useful facts that will be used in our constructions, these observations
follow the lines of Mathew et al. [66]. Lets call a fixed generator matrix G good if there exists a
PPT decoder that can recover the message x with non-negligible probability when encoded with
this specific G. Clearly if the assumption on the hardness of the bounded decoding problem
holds, then the subset of good generator matrices constitutes only a negligible fraction of all
generator matrices.
Observation 5.2 [[66]] The fraction of matrices Q ∈ Fk×n2 that can be expressed as Q =
G1 ⊕ G2 for good generator matrices G1 and G2 is negligible.
Proof: This follows from a simple counting argument: if there are g good generator matrices,
there can be at most
(g
2
)
= O(g2) matrices Q that can be expressed as the exclusive-or of two
good generator matrices.
One possible instantiation of our OT protocol uses the McEliece cryptosystem, which has
PK = Fk×n2 , M = F
k
2, C = F
n
2 , and works as follows:
• Key generation: Generate a generator matrix G ∈ Fk×n2 of a Goppa code together with
the efficient error-correction algorithm Correct that can correct up to t errors. Generate
a uniformly random non-singular matrix S ∈ Fk×k2 and a uniformly random permutation
matrix T ∈ Fn×n2 . Set pk = SGT and sk = (S,G, T ).
• Encryption: Given as input the public-key pk and the message m ∈ Fk2, sample uniformly
at random an error vector e ∈ Fn2 such that HW(e) = t and output the ciphertext ct ←
m · pk ⊕ e.
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• Decryption: Given the ciphertext ct and the secret-key sk as input, compute ct · T−1 =
(mS)G ⊕ eT−1. Then compute mS ← Correct(cT−1) and output m = (mS)S−1.
The security of the McEliece cryptosystem relies on Assumption 5.1. Therefore, when consid-
ering the operation ⊕ on PK, Observation 5.2 implies that Property 2.2 holds straightforwardly
if Assumption 5.1 is true. The security of the McEliece encryption scheme is also based on the
following assumption regarding the pseudorandomness of the public-keys, which is equivalent to
Property 2.3 for this cryptosystem.
Assumption 5.3 Let (pk, sk)
$
← KG(1κ) be the key generation algorithm of the McEliece cryp-
tosystem for pk ∈ Fk×n2 . Let R
$
← Fk×n2 . For every PPT distinguisher A that outputs a decision
bit it holds that
|Pr[A(pk) = 1]− Pr[A(R) = 1]| ∈ negl(κ).
5.2 QC-MDPC based Instantiation
The QC-MDPC cryptosystem [78] is a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem that has much
shorter keys. Currently, it is the most efficient code-based public-key cryptosystem. We briefly
describe it here. In the following wt(x) denotes the Hamming weight of a vector x.
• Key generation: Let circ(v) denote the circulant matrix whose first row is v ∈ Fr2, a
binary array of length r. A QC-MDPC secret-key is a sparse parity-check matrix of form
Hˆ = [circ(f) | circ(g)] where gcd(g, xr − 1) = 1 and wt(f) + wt(g) = t (for some suitable
choice of r and t), and the corresponding public-key is the systematic parity-check matrix
H = [circ(h) | I] where h = f · g−1 mod xr − 1, or equivalently the systematic generator
G =
[
I | circ(h)T
]
, both represented by h ∈ Fr2. .
• Encryption: We encrypt a message by encoding it as a vector e = (e0, e1) ∈ F
2r
2 of
weight wt(e) = t, choosing a uniformly random m
$
←Fr2 and computing the ciphertext as
c← mG+ e ∈ F2r2 .
• Decryption: Let ΨHˆ denote a t-error correcting decoding algorithm that has knowledge of
the secret-key Hˆ. Extract the error vector e by decoding c← ΨHˆ(c).
Assumption 5.4 The decisional QC-MDPC assumption states that distinguishing h from a
uniformly random vector u ∈ Fr2 is unfeasible.
The OW-CPA security of this cryptosystem follows from the pseudorandomess of the public-
key (the decisional QC-MDPC assumption) and the hardness of the bounded decoding problem
(Assumption 5.1), exactly as in the original McEliece.
The QC-MDPC cryptosystem as described here does satisfy the requirements to be used
within our general construction. The analysis is exactly the same as in the original McEliece
PKC in Section 5.1 and boils down to two arguments:
• The fraction of vectors q ∈ Fr2 that can be expressed as q = h1 ⊕ h2 for good vectors h1
and h2 is negligible. Here, a good vector hi, i ∈ {0, 1} is one where the corresponding
parity-check matrix Hi = [circ(h) | I] has a trapdoor. This fact and the hardness of the
bounded decoding problem (Assumption 5.1) imply Property 2.2.
• The pseudorandomness of the public-key implies Property 2.3.
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5.3 LPN-based Instantiation
We also present a solution based on the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. This
problem essentially states that given a system of binary linear equations in which the outputs
are disturbed by some noise, it is difficult to determine the solution. In this work we use the low
noise variant of LPN as first studied by Alekhnovich in [3]. The following equivalent statement
of the assumption is from Do¨ttling et al. [41].
Assumption 5.5 Let the problem parameter be n ∈ N, which is a function of the security
parameter κ. Let m = O(n), ǫ > 0 and ρ = ρ(n) = O(n−1/2−ǫ). Sample B
$
← Fm×n2 , x
$
← Fn2
and e
$
← χmρ . The problem is, given B and y ∈ F
m
2 , to decide whether y = Bx+ e or y
$
← Fm2 .
The assumption states that for every PPT distinguisher A that outputs a decision bit it holds
that
|Pr[A(B, y = Bx+ e) = 1]− Pr[A(B, y
$
← Fm2 ) = 1]| ∈ negl(κ).
The current best distinguishers for this problem require time of the order 2κ
1/2−ǫ
and for this
reason by setting n = O(κ2/(1−2ǫ)) where κ is the security parameter of the encryption scheme
the hardness is normalized to 2Θ(κ).
Our OT protocol can be instantiated based on the IND-CPA secure cryptosystem of Do¨ttling
et al. [41] that is based on the low noise variant of LPN. We should emphasize that we just need
the simplest version of their cryptosystem, which is described below. The IND-CPA security of
their cryptosystem is based on Assumption 5.5.
Consider the security parameter κ, and let n, ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ O(κ
2/(1−2ǫ)) and ρ ∈ O(κ−(1+2ǫ)/(1−2ǫ))
so that Assumption 5.5 is believed to hold. Let G ∈ Fℓ2×n2 be the generator-matrix of a binary
linear error-correcting code C and DecodeC an efficient decoding procedure for C that corrects
up to αℓ2 errors for constant α.
• Key Generation: Let A
$
← Fℓ1×n2 , T
$
← χℓ2×ℓ1ρ and X
$
← χℓ2×nρ . Set B = TA + X,
pk = (A,B) and sk = T . Output (pk, sk).
• Encryption: Given a message m ∈ Fn2 and the public-key pk = (A,B) as input, sample
s
$
← χnρ , e1
$
← χℓ1ρ and e2
$
← χℓ2ρ . Set ct1 = As + e1 and ct2 = Bs + e2 + Gm. Output
ct = (ct1, ct2).
• Decryption: Given a ciphertext ct = (ct1, ct2) and a secret-key sk = T as input, compute
y ← ct2 − T ct1 and m← DecodeC(y). Output m.
If Assumption 5.5 holds, then Property 2.3 trivially holds for this cryptosystem as the public-
keys are pseudorandom [41]. Based on Assumption 5.5, Do¨ttling et al. [41] also proved that this
cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure [41] (which is a stronger notion than OW-CPA). By letting
PK = Fℓ1×n2 × F
ℓ2×n
2 , considering the operation ⊕ on PK and using a counting argument
about the good public-keys as in Section 5.1, we obtain that Property 2.2 trivially holds for this
cryptosystem if Assumption 5.5 holds.
5.4 Instantiation based on the CDH assumption
We will instantiate our scheme by showing that the ElGamal cryptosystem is OW-CPA secure
and has Properties 2.2 and 2.3 under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption.
First we will recall the CDH assumption:
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Assumption 5.6 The Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption requires that for every PPT
adversary A it holds that
Pr[A(G, w, g, ga, gb) = gab] ∈ negl(κ).
where the probability is taken over the experiment of generating a group G of order w with a
generator g on input 1κ and choosing a, b
$
← Zq.
The classical ElGamal cryptosystem [52] is parametrized by a group (G, g, w) of order w
with generator g where the CDH assumption holds. We assume that (G, g, w) is known by all
parties. The cryptosystem consists of a triple of algorithms PKE = (KG,Enc,Dec) that proceed
as follows:
• KG samples sk
$
← Zw, computes pk = g
sk and outputs a secret and public-key pair (pk, sk).
• Enc takes as input a public-key pk and a message m ∈ G, samples r
$
← Zp computes c1 = g
r,
c2 = m · pk
r and outputs a ciphertext ct = (c1, c2).
• Dec takes as input a secret-key sk, a ciphertext ct and outputs a message m = c2/c
sk
1 .
The ElGamal cryptosystem described above is well-known to be OW-CPA secure [52], leaving
us to prove that it has Properties 2.2 and 2.3. Property 2.3 follows trivially from the fact that
pk is chosen uniformly over all elements of G.
Observation 5.7 The ElGamal cryptosystem described above has Property 2.2 under the CDH
assumption.
Proof: First we observe that PK is G, which is a group. Assume by contradiction that an
adversary A succeeds in the experiment of Property 2.2. Under the CDH assumption, A must
know both sk1 and sk2 corresponding to pk1 and pk2. However, we know that pk1 · pk2 = q
for a uniformly random q
$
← G (using multiplicative notation for G). If A freely generated pk1
and pk2 such that pk1 · pk2 = q and knows secret-keys sk1 and sk2, then it knows the discrete
logarithm of q, since it is equal to sk1 + sk2. The CDH assumption implies that computing
discrete logarithms is hard, hence we have a contradiction and the observation holds.
5.4.1 A CDH based instantiation matching the efficiency of Simplest OT [26]
If we instantiate Protocol πOT with the ElGamal cryptosystem described above in a black-
box way, the sender Alice has to compute and send both ciphertexts ct0 = (g
r0 ,m0 · pk
r0
0 ) and
ct1 = (g
r1 ,m1 ·pk
r1
1 ), which amounts to 4 exponentiations and 4 group elements. However, notice
that m0 and m1 are being encrypted under two different public-keys pk0 and pk1. Hence, we
can invoke a result by Bellare et al. [8] showing that ciphertexts ct0 and ct1 can be computed
with the same randomness r. This simple observation can increase both computational and
communication efficiency, since terms of the ciphertexts that depend only on the randomness
only need to be computed and sent once.
Basically, the result of Bellare et al. [8] shows that randomness can be reused while maintain-
ing the same underlying security guarantees when encrypting multiple messages under multiple
different public-keys with “reproducible” cryptosystems, of which the ElGamal cryptosystem is
an example as proven in [8]. Bellare et al. provide a modular generic reduction showing that
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it can be used to prove that reproducible cryptosystems remain IND-CPA or IND-CCA secure
under randomness reuse. Since the ElGamal cryposystem is IND-CPA secure under the DDH
assumption, we can directly optimize the ElGamal based instantiation above under the DDH
assumption. However, we remark that the reduction of Bellare et al. is generic (depending only
on the cryptosystem being reproducible) and straightforward to adapt to OW-CPA security,
which is naturally implied by IND-CPA security. Hence, applying the techniques of Bellare et
al. we can show that the ElGamal cryptosystem remains OW-CPA secure with randomness re-
use under the CDH assumption when multiple different messages are encrypted under multiple
different keys because it is a reproducible cryptosystem (as already proven in [8]). Due to space
restrictions and the lack of novelty, we leave a full discussion of the application of the result of
Bellare et al. [8] to OW-CPA secure cryptosystems to the full version of this paper.
Reusing the same randomness for both ct0 and ct1 means that now Alice only has to com-
pute gr once and send gr,m0 · pk
r
0,m1 · pk
r
1, meaning that it saves 1 exponentiation in terms of
computation and 1 group element in terms of communication. In fact, the total number of expo-
nentiations in this instantiation is only 5 matching the computational efficiency of the Simplest
OT protocol of Chou and Orlandi [26], which is also proven secure in the ROM but only provides
security against static adversaries DDH assumption over a gap-DH group. On the other hand,
this instantiation requires two extra group elements to be communicated. Nevertheless, at this
small cost in communication, this instantiation provides security against adaptive adversaries
under a weaker assumption.
5.5 LWE-based Instantiation
In order to instantiate our scheme under the LWE assumption, we observe that an IND-CPA
secure (and thus OW-CPA secure) public-key encryption scheme proposed by Peikert et al. [88,
Section 7.2] satisfies Properties 2.2 and 2.3. First, notice that it is proven to have Property 2.3
in [88, Lemma 7.3]. The public-key space is PK = Zm×nq × Z
m×l
q , forming a group with its
addition operation +. It is pointed out [88, Section 7.2] that the public-keys of this cryptosystem
are such that they embed several samples of the LWE distribution. Informally, an adversary who
succeeds in the experiment of Property 2.2 must know both secret-keys sk1 adn sk2 associated
to pk1 and pk2, respectively. If we have that pk1 + pk2 = q for a random q
$
← PK, an adversary
who manages to learn the corresponding sk1 and sk2 is able to decide whether q is an instance of
the LWE distribution or not, which contradicts the LWE assumption. Due to the lack of space,
we leave a formal argument to the full version of this paper.
5.6 Other Instantiations
In the full version of the paper we will present instantiations based on Quadratic Residuosity
(QR), Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) and NTRU assumptions.
6 Implementation
Here, we propose concrete parameters and present implementation results for the QC-MDPC
instantiation of our OT protocol. As the total cost of the entire OT protocol will be dominated by
the key generation, encryption and decryption costs of the underlying public-key cryptosystem,
we restrict our presentation to these respective costs.
20
6.1 Parameters
We computed the classical security level of a few parameter sets for QC-MDPC McEliece using
a SAGE script. The quantum level is one half of the values here presented (e.g. to obtain 128-
bit quantum secure parameters, take the 256-bit classically secure ones). The communication
complexity is 2n bits for each party. Results are shown in table 6.1.
Security Level Codimension r Code length n Row density w Introduced errors t
256 32771 2*32771 2*137 264
192 19853 2*19853 2*103 199
128 10163 2*10163 2*71 134
Table 1: Parameters for QC-MDPC PKC
We recall that it is necessary that r be prime and that the polynomial (xr − 1)/(x − 1)
be irreducible over GF(2). There exists a trade-off between communication costs and decoding
complexity. For instance, these parameters are quite tight and decoding may be somewhat slow.
By increasing r to, say, r = 49139 (50% more bandwidth), decoding speed roughly quadruples
(encoding becomes about half as fast, but it is far faster than decoding to begin with).
6.2 Implementation
Some running times are shown in Table 2. These results are for a (non-vectorized) C imple-
mentation, compiled with 64-bit gcc under Windows 10, on an Intel i7-5500U @ 2.4 GHz with
TurboBoost disabled. Running times are measured in kilocycles. The underlying PRNG is
ChaCha20. The implementation is mostly isochronous, to prevent side-channel timing attacks.
Security Level Key generation Encryption n Decryption
256 507.48 kcyc 483.51 kcyc 10,337.41 kcyc
128 101.59 kcyc 73.85 kcyc 1,758.66 kcyc
80 67.45 kcyc 52.49 kcyc 497.53 kcyc
Table 2: Running Times (in kilocycles) for QC-MDPC PKC.
7 Conclusions
In this work we presented a framework for obtaining efficient round-optimal UC-secure OT pro-
tocols that are secure against active adaptive adversaries. Our construction can be instantiated
with the low noise LPN, McEliece, QC-MDPC, LWE, and CDH assumptions. Our instantiations
based on the low noise LPN, McEliece, and QC-MDPC assumptions (which are more efficient
than the previous works) are the first OT protocols, which are UC-secure against active adap-
tive adversaries based on these assumptions. Our CDH-based instantiation has basically the
same efficiency as the Chou-Orlandi Simplest OT protocol and only two extra group elements of
communication, but achieves security against stronger adversaries under a weaker assumption.
In the full version, we will show that it is also possible to get instantiations based on QR, DCR
and NTRU assumptions.
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